Iraq Predicament and Iran Nuke
© November 2006 Tienzen (Jeh-Tween) Gong
American people has spoken out on 2006 election that she cannot stand the Iraq predicament much longer.
There are many differences between this Iraq problem and the Vietnam war. The two major differences are as followings:
I. Learning lessons from history
- Tactically, there is no single identifiable foe which can negotiate with. To negotiate with the true foe will be the recognition that terrorism is an acceptable way of international behavior.
- Strategically, the capitulation in Vietnam would bring only humiliation to America while the failure in Iraq will guarantee a Nuclear Iran. Now, six Arabic countries declared their rights to own nuclear technology. This is just a warming up exercise to legitimize the Iranian Nuke program.
II. Some golden laws on world security
III. The only way to stop the Iran Nuke
IV. Finding a true friend
- a. The way of winning in Iraq
- b. Understanding the foe, the only way for victory
- c. Understanding China
- i. A brief history of the new China (PRC)
- ii. Facts about the Cultural Revolution
- iii. The true enemy of China in 1966
V. Solution of Iraq predicament and Iran Nuke problem
I. Learning lessons from history
The best way to resolve the Iraq predicament and the Iran Nuke problem is learning lessons from the history first.
In Dr. Henry Kissinger's book Diplomacy (1994, Simon & Schuster), he wrote, "Part of the trouble was that Le Duc Tho had only one objective, whereas, as a superpower, America had to have many. Le Duc Tho was determined to culminate his revolutionary career in victory; America had to balance domestic against international considerations, the future of Vietnam against maintaining America's global role. Le Duc Tho handled the American psyche as a skilled surgeon might operate on his patient; the Nixon Administration was obliged to fight on so many fronts that it only rarely had the opportunity to conduct an offensive diplomacy." (page 685)
"The phenomenon of a totally implacable foe uninterested in compromise -- indeed, seeking to turn deadlock into a weapon -- was alien to the American experience. An ever-greater number of Americans yearned for compromise. But Hanoi's leaders had launched their war in order to win, not to cut a deal. Thus, the categories of the American debate -- the many proposals for bombing halts, cease-fires, deadlines for American withdrawal, and coalition government -- were never relevant to Hanoi's calculations." (page 684, ibid)
" At the end of 1966, North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong told Harrison Salisbury of The New York Times that, though the united States was far stronger militarily, it would lose in the end because more Vietnamese than Americans were prepared to die for Vietnam, and to fight as long as it might take to outlast the Americans. His assessment proved correct." (page 660, ibid)
"One of the principal lessons of the Korean War ought to have been that protracted, inconclusive wars shatter America's domestic consensus. Yet Washington seemed to have gleaned exactly the opposite lesson:..." (page 659, ibid)
"Having transmuted the war into a domestic conflict between good and evil at home, the Peace Movement preferred -- for reasons it viewed as highly moral -- America's collapse in Vietnam to an outcome which, precisely because it might be considered "honorable," might also whet its government's appetite for further foreign adventures." (page 688, ibid)
"they feared that, if Nixon's notion of peace with honor was permitted to stand, America might again be tempted into the same kind of international over commitment for which, to them, Vietnam had become the despised symbol." (page 694, ibid)
"Although, in a strict sense, the only dominoes which fell were Cambodia and Laos, anti-Western revolutionaries in many other areas of the globe began to feel emboldened. It is doubtful that Castro would have intervened in Angola, or the Soviet Union in Ethiopia, had America not been perceived to have collapsed in Indochina,..." (page 698, ibid)
"Washington should have asked itself two basic questions: Was it possible to establish democracy and achieve military victory more or less simultaneously? And even more crucial, will the benefits justify the cost? The presidents or presidential advisers who committed America to ground combat in Vietnam took an affirmative answer for granted." (page 659, ibid)
"Even a political leader less shaped by mandarin traditions than Diem would have found it daunting to build a pluralistic democracy amidst a guerrilla war and in a society fragmented by regions, sects, and clans. A credibility gap was inherent in America's entire enterprise, not so much because America's leaders deceived the public but because they deceived themselves about their capabilities, including the ease with which familiar institutions could be transferred to other cultures." (page 653, ibid)
II. Some golden laws on world security
Dr. Henry Kissinger is, indeed, the greatest sage on the world security. If American people did take the few short passages above to the bosom after the Vietnam War, the Iraqi problem would not have happened at the first place. Yet, the solution for the Iraq predicament can be found in those short passages. In fact, a few golden laws can be found in them.
The above five laws are valid and applicable in all cases: Korea, Vietnam, Iraq or Iran. With this five laws, the chance for an American victory in Iraq is not good. If America fails in Iraq, a nuclear Iran becomes almost inevitable.
- Law one: When people is resolving an issue with bloods and killing, it cannot be resolved with democracy.
The Iraqi insurgents are now using democracy as camouflage. Dr. Kissinger wrote, "One administration after another had attempted a dual task, each part of which alone would have been difficult to achieve by itself: the defeat of a guerrilla army with secure bases all around an extended periphery, and the democratization of a society with no tradition of pluralism." (page 658, ibid)
- Law two: No military power is able to defeat a group people who is happy to die for her cause.
Laotze said, " 人 不 畏 死 ， 奈 何 以 死 懼 之 。 " (When a man is not afraid of death, how can we scare him with killing?)
- Law three: Ignorance will guarantee a failure.
In 孫 子 兵 法 (The Art of War, by Suntze), it states three rules.
- 知 己 知 彼 ， 百 戰 不 殆 (Knowing ourselves and knowing our foe, we will never be defeated.)
- 不 知 彼 而 知 己 ， 一 勝 一 負 。 (Not knowing the foe while knowing ourselves, the chance of winning is 50%.)
- 不 知 彼 ， 不 知 己 ， 每 戰 必 敗 。 (Not knowing the foe and not knowing ourselves, we will be defeated in every war.)
- Law four: Assimilation is acceptance without compulsion.
Even if the America's exceptionalism -- the belief in the universal applicability of American values -- is true, the American values will be rejected if they are imposed to any culture with a process other than the process of assimilation.
- Law five: The meaning of the term "victory" can only be defined by the foe.
Only when the foe accepts the defeat, there is a victory.
Dr. Kissinger wrote, "Militarily, Tet is now recognized as a major communist defeat. ...
Nevertheless, the Tet Offensive turned into a major psychological victory for Hanoi." (page 670, ibid)
"In withdrawing American troops from Vietnam, Nixon had to liquidate a commitment which four American presidents over the course of two decades had proclaimed as being vital to the security of all free people." (page 674, ibid)
"If ending the war was the only objective, the Saigon government became in the eyes of the critics an obstacle to peace rather than an ally. The original conviction that South Vietnam was a key element of American security had been discarded long ago." (page 688, ibid)
The Iran Nuke is significantly different from the North Korea Nuke which is just a suicide bomb. That is, North Korea has no ambition outside of the Korea peninsula, and she will never use it before her suicide. On the other hand, Iran has a very ambitious agenda. A nuclear Iran will never be contented as a coffee drinker in the Nuclear Club.
III. The only way to stop the Iran nuke
There is one and only one way to stop the Iran Nuke. That is, Iran is willing to give it up.
In mathematics, if an equation has one solution, that solution can be transformed by some transformation functions, such as, La place transformation. If Iran Nuke issue can be resolved militarily, it then can definitely be transformed into other form of solution. If it cannot be resolved militarily, how can any other option mean anything to Iran?
Can air strike and sanctions stop the Iran nuclear ambition? From the example of Iraq, these two measures might weaken the government but was unable to overthrow it. That is, the military solution means the Iraq-type invasion. Yet, if America does not succeed in Iraq, where is America's credibility to convince Iran one way or the other? Any type of American withdraw from Iraq, honorable or otherwise, will be viewed as a total defeat in the eyes of Iran. Indeed, American victory in Iraq can only be defined by Iran. Only if there is an American victory in Iraq, Iran will then be willing to negotiate. For Iran, the American victory in Iraq must consist of two points.
Yet, the 2006 election has showed that many Americans are now having the cut-and-run mentality for this Iraq predicament.
- America is able to establish some permanent military bases in Iraq.
- There is no domestic opposition for the above America's Iraq policy.
a. The way of winning in Iraq
In fact, America can gain the victory in Iraq with the following steps.
In this way, America will no longer suffer a daily casualty, and the domestic opposition will be reduced. When America cannot be defeated, the in-fighting among Iraqis becomes aimless and will settle sooner or later.
- Support a figure-head government. It carries no responsibility for governing the country, as it has no such ability anyway.
- Establish some permanent military bases far away from the Iraqi population center (such as at some border areas).
- Invite another country with 100,000 troops or more to secure Iraqi's infrastructure (water, power and oil facilities).
- Use money to manipulate the in-fighting between Iraqis.
This model is not a new invention. It is almost identical to the Afghanistan model. In Afghanistan, this other country is NATO. Yet, there is not another NATO available for Iraq.
In fact, there are, at least, two countries (Russia or China) which are capable of acting as another NATO. As Russia is still having some internal military issues among her former Republics and as Russia was having a global ambition, China is a much better candidate.
Of course, there is no reason at all for China to do such a thing at this moment. China needs time (10 years) to do the catching-up to America. The both situations below will provide China that needed time.
However, China will do such a thing if she trusts America. Yet, the only way China can truly trust America is that America truly trusts China. How can America trust China while not knowing anything about Chinese culture?
- The continuation of the Iraq predicament.
- The withdraw of American force before a stable and a pro-American Iraqi government is established.
Dr. Kissinger wrote, "In September 1965, the same misunderstanding would occur during the Johnson Administration with respect to China, when Chinese defense Minister Lin Piao's manifesto on "People's War" spoke grandly of "encircling" the world's industrial powers by revolutions throughout the Third Word. The Johnson Administration interpreted this as a warning that China might intervene in Hanoi, ignoring Lin's subtext, which stressed the need for self-reliance among revolutionaries. Reinforced by Mao's comment that Chinese armies did not go abroad, it was meant as well to provide a strong hint that China did not intend to become involved again in communist wars of liberation." (page 644, ibid)
"Washington's assessment of the overall international context had made it too preoccupied with Chinese intervention, ignoring Lin Piao's statement that Chinese armies would not go abroad, and which was reiterated by Mao to Edgar Snow, an American journalist sympathetic to the Chinese communists: Mao told Snow that China had no troops outside its own frontiers and had no intention of fighting anybody unless its own territory were attacked. Thus it was that, in two separate wars a decade and a half apart, America paid a price for not taking Chinese statements seriously: in Korea, it had ignored Chinese warnings and marched to the Yalu, triggering Chinese intervention; in Vietnam, it disregarded assurances by the Chinese that they would not intervene, causing America to reject the only strategy which might have brought victory." (page 660, ibid)
These two passages demonstrate two points.
b. Understanding the foe, the only way for victory
- Americans did not understand the Chinese statements.
- Americans did not trust any Chinese statement.
Of course, to trust the foe is the stupidest thing that a person can do. However, with the true understanding and the true knowledge, any statement (straight or adulterated) must show its true face.
- For Korea War, China's logic was very simple.
Well, with this simple logic, what should be the conclusion?
- Without China, the UN was not a true UN. That is, the UN seat belongs to China sooner or later. There was no reason for hurry.
- Taiwan could never escape from China. Taiwan could declare an independence for 50, 100, or 500 years. Yet, it will inevitable be part of China. It could not swim away.
Note: China has a 5,000 year history, and 500 years is just a blink of the eyes.
- If North Korea was defeated completely, not only would American force be right at the front door of China but the chance to change that situation could be close to zero for long time to come.
- China will not be defeated militarily with a Japan-type invasion into China launched by America. China was able and ready to fight America in China for 50 years or 500 years.
- Mao needed to pacify or to neutralize the three million troops left in China by the KMT. The battle field of Korea was a good place for that.
- For the Vietnam War, China's logic was also very simple.
With such a logic, we can 100% sure that Mao's statement of 1965 was straight and sincere. Yet, without the understanding, we have paid too steep of a price which should not be paid.
- Hanoi was not in any danger. Why should China worry about how soon the victory can come? What was the difference between 10 years, 50 years or 100 years as long as the victory was guaranteed? Furthermore, to hold America down the sinking sand, the longer the better for China.
Note: American analyst views any current issue with a vision of 10 years or 20 years into the future. Chinese sees any issue with 100 years or 500 years as the unit of the time scale.
Dr. Kissinger wrote, "The greatest irony of the American domestic debate turned out to be that Hanoi was in fact totally uninterested in unilateral American withdrawal. This point is still misunderstood in much of the literature on the war." (page 690, ibid)
- The difference between China and Russia was no longer on the ideological level at that time. A military conflict between them was in the horizon.
- Most importantly, Mao was ready to launch a major war, the Culture Revolution, which eventually took his life.
c. Understanding China
America was too strong and too powerful and was able to afford a few mistakes before. Yet, America might not have such a luxury any more now. The above two examples are not the only mistakes. In fact, almost everything in China was and still is misunderstood by America. After Nixon's visit in China, the June 4th Tiananmen Square event not only did change the direction of America's China policy but changed the American people's view on China. Today, we are shocked by China's rising and are hoping that the governability issue which came to surface with the June 4th, 1989 event will eventually destroy China. Have we ever contemplated a possibility, however small, that the June 4th event was an elixir for China? With a true understanding, it is not too hard to conclude that June 4th, 1989 event was indeed the philosopher's stone for China. And, this understanding must begin from the understanding the true meaning of Cultural Revolution which happened 10 years before then.
About 文 化 大 革 命 (The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966 - 1976):
- Almost all historians (both East and West) view the Cultural revolution as the political infighting.
On the surface, these were the case. Many more books were only interested in discussing the abuse and the cruelty which happened during those 10 years.
- The madness of 紅 衛 兵 (The Red Guard).
- To oust 劉 少 奇 (Liu Shao-qi) as the Head of State.
- To remove 林 彪 (Lin Piao, Defense Minister) as Mao's successor.
- To install the Gang of Four as his successors.
Mao would laugh his head off in his grave if he would have read those so-called history books on Cultural Revolution. In the eyes of Mao, neither Liu, Deng nor Lin did earn any right to be his opponents. He could neutralize them with a snap. The best that they could be were the smallest pawns in this big Cultural Revolution war. Mao did not lie to no one. His war was Cultural Revolution. His true enemy was Confucius, a 2,500 year old Immortal. Any foot soldier of Confucianism must be neutralized.
In the book, Mao -- A Life (1999, Henry Holt and Company, LLC), the author Mr. Philip Short wrote, "Some time that summer, probably in June [three months before Mao's death], he summoned Hua [ 華 國 鋒 ] , Jiang Qing [ 江 青 , Mao's wife] and several other members of the Politburo to his bedside. There he told them, as if delivering a last testament:
In my life, I have done two things. First I fought Chiang Kai-shek for several decades, and drove him to a few small islands. ... We fought our way to Beijing, and at last to the Forbidden City. There are not many people who do not recognize those achievements. ... The second thing I have done you all know. It was to launch the Cultural Revolution, which now has the support of few and is opposed by many. But this matter is not ended yet. It is a legacy which must be handed down to the next generation. How should it be handed down? If not in peace, then in turmoil. If this is not properly handled, there will be bloodshed. Heaven alone knows what you will do."
(page 624, Mao -- a life)
- In The World Almanac, 1995, it wrote, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution tried to impose a utopian egalitarian program in China and spread revolution abroad; political struggle, often violent, convulsed China in 1965 - 68." (page 531)
As we can see from Mr. Short's writing, Mao wanted to hand down the Cultural Revolution at his death bed in 1976. That is, the Cultural Revolution went way beyond the period of 1965 - 68.
The point is not how wrong that those historians were. We must ask two simple questions:
- What is the true purpose of the Cultural Revolution?
- What is the final result that Mao wanted for the Cultural Revolution in his death bed in 1976 while all visible political foes have vanished long ago?
i. A brief history of the new China (PRC)
Every historical event is the consequence of some events happened before. The shocking September 11 also had many precursory causes. In fact, the Cultural Revolution was indeed the direct consequence of some previous events.
- Economical revolution: after the victory over Guomindang, Mao wanted to build up China's economy.
Mr. Short wrote, "Shortly before nationwide victory, Mao spoke publicly of his concern about the economic tasks ahead. 'We shall have to master what we do not know,' he warned. 'we must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no matter who they are. ... We must acknowledge our ignorance, and not pretend to know what we do not know.' " (page 440, Mao -- a life)
And this had the following stages:
- 一 面 倒 (lean on one-side [Soviet] completely) in 1953.
Mr. Short wrote, "A Five-Year Plan was worked out modeled on Soviet practice, with more than a hundred large Soviet-built heavy industrial plants at its core.
Mao would afterwards complain that 'dogmatism' had taken hold at that time. 'Since we didn't understand these things and had absolutely no experience,' he grumbled, 'all we could do in our ignorance was to import foreign methods. ... It didn't matter whether a [Russian] article was correct or not, the Chinese listened all the same and respectfully obeyed.' But in 1953, Russian guidance was exactly what Mao wanted. That spring he personally urged officials to 'ship up a high tide of learning from the Soviet Union throughout the whole country'. " (page 440, Mao -- a life).
In 1955, Mao launched Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (APCs) which was modeled from Soviet's collectivization program.
- 超 英 趕 美 -- by 1956, Mao was thinking about surpassing British and catching up with America.
Mr. Short wrote, "..., Mao now set several new targets. Within the next few decades, he said, China must become 'the number-one country in the world', surpassing the United States in cultural, scientific, technological and industrial development. 'I don't consider [American achievements] as anything so terrific,' he went on breezily." (page 448, Mao -- a life).
Mao launched three work-horses in order to achieve his goal.
- 政 治 挂 帥 (Political will as the commander-in-chief). That is, every difficulty can be overcome by the political will. This, in fact, led the accomplishment of 兩 彈 一 星 (two bombs, [nuclear- , H-bomb ] and the launch of satellite.)
- 人 民 公 社 (people's communes) , launched in August 1958. The precursor of this was Khrushchev's Secret Speech in 1956 which denounced Stalin who was a brutal psychopath. In Mao's view that under Stalin's leadership, the Soviet had made 'glorious achievements' as a nation, and his personal morality was secondary, as Mao himself would put the China's future before anything else, morality or otherwise.
Mr. Short wrote, "Mao's eminence and sense of national mission mean that his only remaining loyalty was to his vision of China's future. His colleagues -- men and women with whom, in some cases, he had spent thirty years in shared struggle -- were being reduced to tools in the working out of his dreams." (page 445, Mao -- a life).
Thus, the China - Soviet polemic began. Furthermore,
Mr. Short wrote, "The Soviet model was perceived to be failing. The co-operatives were not generating the agricultural surpluses necessary to finance a Soviet-style industrialization programme; the intellectuals, needed to run it, had shown themselves unreliable; and Soviet financial aid, to help pay for it was not available -- because the Russians were using their money to shore up their client states in eastern Europe." (page 476, Mao -- a life).
Mao tried to combine agriculture, industry, commerce, culture, education and self-defense with the People's Commune.
- 大 躍 進 (the Great Leap Forward) , launched in May 1958. This was prompted by the event of Soviet's successful launch of the sputnik in October 1957.
Mr. Short wrote, " The catalyst was undoubtedly Russia's successful launch of the sputnik, which awoke Mao to the possibilities opened up by technological advance. Science, once his interest had been aroused, fascinated him, but in a medieval rather than a modern sense. ...
To Mao, scientific progress justified his long-held belief that mind could triumph over matter. ...
It was the concept that he seized on -- the prospect of unbounded progress through technical revolution." (page 482, Mao -- a life).
- The results and consequences of the first 10 years (1950 - 1960):
- 百 花 齊 放 The Hundred Flowers Campaign (meaning, let 100 flowers to blossom and let everyone to speak freely, launched at the end of 1956) -- a rectification movement to make the Party more responsive to the wishes of the people.
This movement was prompted by the crisis in Poland and the Hungarian revolt.
Mr. Short wrote, "He [Mao] went on to ask what had caused the storms in eastern Europe. Part of the answer, he told the Central Committee, was that the Communist Parties in Poland and Hungary had failed to do a proper job of eliminating counter-revolutionaries. China had not made the error. But the other factor was bureaucratism, which had led Party cadres in both countries to become estranged from the masses. This problem China had not solved: ...
The problem in Hungary, he argued, was that the Party there had failed to deal in a timely fashion with the contradictions between rulers and ruled, with the result that they had festered and become antagonistic." (page 456, Mao -- a life).
"In private, Mao was more forthright. The critics had got it wrong. he told a conference of senior Party officials later the same month. There was not too much freedom but too little. ...
'If they have something to fart about, let them fart! If it's out, then one can decide whether it smells bad or good. If the people think their farts stink, they will be isolated.' ...
[Mao said:] Wouldn't it be a little strange if we communists, who have never feared imperialism or Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang... were now to be afraid of students causing trouble and peasants raising a fuss over the co-operatives? Fear is no solution. The more afraid you are, the more ghosts will come to visit you... I think that whoever wants to cause trouble should be allowed to do so for as long as he wants. If a month is not sufficient, give him two months. In short, don't stop the show until he's had enough. If you stop the show too hastily, one of these days he will cause trouble again... What good will come out of this? The good will be that we will expose problems fully and distinguish right from wrong ... We can't just stifle everything all the time. .. Contradictions have to be exposed before problems can be solved." (page 458, Mao -- a life).
"The 'Hundred Flowers' was the most ambitious attempt ever undertaken in any communist country to combine a totalitarian system with democratic checks and balances." (page 464, Mao -- a life).
- 反 右 鬥 爭 (Anti-Rightists Campaign, launched a few months after the Hundred Flowers Campaign). The Hundred Flowers Campaign was not a 'free speech amendment.' Its sole purpose was to expose the contradictions.
Mr. Short wrote, "The main thrust of the criticism that ensued was that the communists, whom the intelligentsia had welcomed in 1949 as liberators from Guomindang misrule, had developed, after less than eight years in office, into a new bureaucratic class which monopolized power and privilege and had alienated itself from the masses. Mao, it turned out, had not been wrong in the lessons he drew from the Hungarian revolt: in the eyes of non-communists, Party officials had indeed become 'an aristocracy divorced from the people'. " (page 465, Mao -- a life).
"The focus of Mao's attention was moving ominously from 'flowers blooming' to the uprooting of 'poisonous weeds'." (page 467, Mao -- a life).
"The 'Rightists' were not shot... But 520,000 smaller fry -- one in twenty of all non-communist intellectuals and officials in China -- underwent labour reform or were exiled to the countryside o learn class consciousness from the peasants....
They, and half-a-million others like them, saw their lives and those of their families pitilessly destroyed. Unlike the landlords and the counter-revolutionaries, they were punished not for their actions (past or present, real or imagined), but solely for their ideas." (page 470, Mao -- a life).
- Soviet betrayal -- in November 1957, Khrushchev had offered Mao a secret agreement to provide China with nuclear weapons technology, including a sample atom bomb. In the Spring of 1960, the Soviet officially informed China that, with immediate effect, all Russian experts were being withdrawn and all Russian aid was being terminated.
- Three years natural disaster (1959 - 60 - 61) --
Mr. Short wrote, "By July it was already clear that the 1960 harvest would be even worse than the previous year's. This was partly attributable to the weather. One hundred million acres, more than a third of all cultivated land, were in the grip of the worst drought for a century.
"In 1959 and 1960, some 20 million Chinese starved to death, and 15 million fewer children were born, because women were too weak to conceive. Five million more perished from hunger in 1961.
"the Great Leap had ended in an apocalyptic failure. His grandiose dream of universal plenty had been metamorphosed into an epic of pure horror. At the end of 1960, he set aside once and for all the idea of making China a great economic power, never to concern himself with it again." (page 504, Mao -- a life).
- Searching for the true enemy:
Mao was not a person who can ever accept a defeat. He must find his true enemy and then destroy it. In terms of political power in China, no one could be the opponent of Mao.
Mr. Short wrote, "Of all the Chinese leaders Mao purged during his years of power, only Lin Biao attempted to resist. Peng Dehuai [the top commander during the Korea War against America, a national hero] and Liu Shaoqi [Head of State] had gone meekly to their fates, maintaining to the last their unswerving devotion to the Party. Neither had attempted to defend himself; neither tried to hit back. Even Gao Gang [ 高 崗 , head of the State Planning Commission in 1953], who made a kind of protest by committing suicide, had first confessed his errors.
Lin was different. In the end, the only defense he could find was what Mao called the 'last and best' of the '36 stratagems' from the military manuals of Chinese antiquity: to run away. But he did not abase himself. Nor did he submit to Mao' will." (page 599, Mao -- a life)
"By July 18  ... that evening the 'Zhongnanhai Insurrectionists' held an 'accusation meeting' within the leadership compound, at which Liu [Shaoqi] and his wife were made to stand silently for two hours, bowing from the waist, while their accusers harangued them. Mao's doctor saw them being beaten and kicked, while soldiers of the Central Guard Unit stood by and watched: Liu's shirt had been torn open, and people were jerking him around by the hair. Two-and-a-half weeks later, the process was repeated. This time the couple had to stand in the Red Guards' 'jetplane' position, bending forward with their arms stretched back behind them, while Liu was interrogated anew about his alleged 'national betrayals'. Deng Xiaoping and Tao Zhu and their wives were subjected to similar indignities. ...
On August 7 , he [Liu] wrote to Mao, resigning as Head of State." (page 569, Mao -- a life).
However, Mao did fail dismally on his economic revolution. He must find the true enemy who had defeated him. Mao had always emphasized the need of continuous revolution, that is, to defeat every new enemy. By that time (in 1960s), he had faced the following enemies.
- Before 1949, his enemy was Chiang Kai-shek and his Guomindang.
- During the land reform, his enemy was landlords and counter-revolutionary.
- After the Hungary revolt (November 1956), though the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Mao found that his enemy was the corrupted low level Party cadres and the intelligentsia. He launched the anti-Rightist Campaign. Mr. Short wrote, "The anti-Rightist Campaign had claimed half-a-million victims." (page 502, Mao -- a life).
- In July 1959 at the Lushan conference, 彭 德 懷 (Peng Dehuai, the Defense Minister and the national hero who defeated America in Korea) questioned Mao's policy of 'politics is the commander' after he (Peng) learned that millions people starved to death in that year. Peng said, "In the view of some comrades, putting politics in command can take the place of everything else. They have forgotten that it is aimed at giving full play to the enthusiasm and creativity of the masses in order to speed up economic construction. It cannot take the place of economic principles, still less can it be a substitute for concrete measures in economic work."
For Mao, the revolution is the business of sacrifice. The death of a few millions is indeed a great sacrifice, but it is the necessary price to pay for the revolution (to make China the number one in the world). Mao was shocked that the national hero had lost his nerve after seeing some starvation.
In Mao's home province Hunan, there was a slang " 稀 牛 糞 ， 糊 不 上 壁 " (The Bullshit cannot be pasted on the wall.) In the countryside of Hunan, people used the cow dung to seal the cracks of the outside wall. The runny cow dung (the bullshit) cannot be used in such a task. Although the word 'bullshit' in English is a very vulgar phrase, the runny cow dung has two meanings in Chinese:
- It is useless.
- It cannot be transformed to become useful.
Of course, Peng was not a threat to Mao in any sense. Yet, Mao realized that his failure was caused by his troops which were all made of bullshit stocks. Peng was relieved as the Defense Minister. Mao launched a campaign against 'Right opportunism'. Mr. Short wrote, "The anti-Rightist Campaign had claimed half-a-million victims. The campaign against 'Right opportunism', as the movement against critics of the Leap was known, triggered a political blood-letting more than ten times larger: six million people, most of them Party members or low-level officials, were criticized and struggled against for allegedly opposing Mao's policies." (page 502, Mao -- a life).
At this point, Mao's enemy was his own Party, including the top of the top Party leaders.
ii. Facts about the Cultural Revolution
Mao was shocked by the Peng's event of 1959 that his un-defeated troops and his right hand and his left hand were all made of bullshit stocks. In January 1962, Mao held a 7,000-cadre big conference. Mr. Short wrote, "He [Mao] had been dismayed by the hostility shown by grass-roots delegates to Great Leap Forward policies, and by demands from the hall for an explanation of why the disaster had occurred. 'They complain all day long and watch plays at night, they eat three full meals a day -- and fart; that's what Marxism-Leninism means to them,' he grumbled." (page 511, Mao -- a life).
At this time, Mao was almost given up of any hope on his Party and the Chinese people. Yet, with a last attempt, he launched the Socialist Education Movement in the Winter of 1962. Mr. Short wrote, "In its initial form, the movement [Socialist Education Movement] was directed against cadre corruption, and such anti-socialist behaviors as arranged marriages, geomancy, sorcery, Buddhist and Daoist rites, and ancestor-worship." (page 516, Mao -- a life).
"By the spring of 1964, ... Not only was cadre corruption almost universal, but so many grass-roots officials had been purged in one political campaign or another in the course of the preceding ten years that there were no more 'clean' local leaders to draw on. Outside cadres, seconded to oversee the movement, found themselves having to replace one group of flawed officials with another equally dubious group because no one else was available.
To deal with that situation, Liu Shaoqi unleashed, in September 1964, the most sweeping purge of rural Party organizations ever undertaken in China." (page 518, Mao -- a life).
At this juncture, if Mao still intended to transform China into the greatest country in the world, he must create a new breed of Chinese people. After 20 years of military revolution, he defeated Chiang Kai-shek. After 15 years of economy revolution, Mao was defeated. The only choice for him now is to launch the Cultural Revolution, to create a new breed of Chinese people.
All historians (East or West) view the Cultural Revolution in the following context.
- It started on November 10, 1965 when an article, written by Yao Wenyuan (one of the Gang of Four), which criticized a drama play The Dismissal of Hai Rui 海 瑞 罷 官 (written by Wu Han, a historian and a deputy mayor of Beijing, a protege of Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing), was published in a Shanghai newspaper.
The purpose of this article was attributed for ousting Peng Zhen as the mayor of Beijing.
Mr. Short wrote, "On May 16 , the meeting approved a Central Committee circular, ostensibly issued to replace the now discredited 'February Outline', but actually the first official salvo of what was to become known (in Chinese) as the 'Great Revolution [to establish] Proletarian Culture' -- the Cultural revolution." (page 532, Mao -- a life).
"The Cultural Revolution, it declared, was 'a great revolution that touches people to their very souls', an 'irresistible general trend', which would vanquish bourgeois and feudal ideology, and instil a 'proletarian world outlook', exemplified by 'the great Red banner of Mao Zedong Thought'. It was a revolution from the bottom up, in which the masses would liberate themselves." (page 541, Mao -- a life).
On May 14, 1966, 大 字 報 , a wall-poster movement began in Beijing University.
At the end of May 1966, the students of Qinghua University Middle School coined the name 紅 衛 兵 (the Red Guard).
On August 18, 1966, Mao met Red Guard representatives while over a million Red Guards, some from as far away as Sichuan and Guangdong, converged on the capital for the first of ten gigantic rallies in Tiananmen Square.
- Destroying everything old:
Mr. Short wrote, " It began within days of the August 18 rally. One of the first victims was the eminent writer, Lao She,... With some thirty other cultural figures, he was taken to the courtyard of the former Confucian Temple in Beijing. There they were given yin-yang haircuts (with one half of the head shaven, the other left uncut); black ink was poured over their faces; and signs labeling them as 'ox demons and snake spirits' hung around their necks. Then they were made to kneel as the Red Guards beat them with stakes and leather belts. ... Next day he [Lao She] drowned himself in a shallow lake, not far from the Forbidden City.
Thousands of lesser victims met similar fates. There was scarcely a housing block in Beijing where the Red Guards did not beat at least one person to death. Over four days at the end of August, in one small suburban area, 325 people were killed, ...
The rapidity with which peaceable, idealistic young students were transformed into avenging furies astounded older people. To Mao, it was a sign of the Chinese people's 'fighting spirit'. How many times before, from the May Fourth movement in 1919, to the 'Hundred Flowers' forty years later, had apparently tranquil campuses erupted in a matter of hours to become seething cauldrons of political agitation? ... Lin Biao [Defense Minister] had urged them to 'smash the Four Olds' -- 'old thought, old culture, old customs and old practices'. The Security Minister, Xie Fuzhi, had told the police to give the Red Guards free rein:" (page 543, Mao -- a life).
"The Red Guards curtailed even the vestigial freedoms that then existed, imposing a new, Maoist orthodoxy more rigid than any that had gone before. Their object was to expunge the old, to 'burn the books and bury the scholars alive', as the Emperor Qin Shihuang had done, two thousand years before, so that China would become, in Mao's phrase, 'a blank sheet of paper', ready to be inscribed with the holy writ of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.
To fill the vacuum left by the 'Four Olds', the 'Four News' were devised -- 'new ideology, new culture, new customs, new habits'. In practice, that meant the exaltation of Mao and his ideas to the exclusion of everything else. He was no longer venerated; he was worshiped." (page 549, Mao -- a life).
- By August 1967, Liu Shaoqi was removed from his position as the Head of State. In October 1968, Lin Biao was confirmed to be Mao's new successor.
Mr. Short wrote, "In the autumn of 1968, therefore, the rustication programme was revived on an expanded basis -- but this time it was compulsory. Over the next two years, five million young people would be sent to the countryside. In a parallel programme, several million cadres and intellectuals were ordered out of the cities to live in rural 'May 7 Cadre Schools' -- so-called because Mao had put forward the idea of work-study among the peasants in a letter to Lin Biao on May 7, 1966." (page 576, Mao -- a life).
- Lin Biao fled and died in September 1971.
Mr. Short wrote, " Despite Zhou's (the Premier) order, the Trident ... at 12.32 a.m. on Monday, September 13 , with its navigation lights turned off and the airport in total darkness, the aircraft took off.
Zhou ordered a total ban on aircraft movements throughout China,...He then went to report to Mao.
While he was there, Wu Faxian telephoned to say that Lin's plane was heading for Mongolia and to ask whether it should be shot down. Mao responded philosophically: 'The skies will rain; widows will remarry; these things are unstoppable. Let them go.'
Thirty hours later, ... The Mongolian Foreign Ministry had issued an official protest because a Chinese air force Trident had violated Mongolian airspace ... , and had crashed near the settlement of Undur Khan. All nine people on board had been killed. ...
The bodies, which were identified by Soviet KGB forensic experts, were buried nearby." (page 598, Mao -- a life).
- In September 1972, Mao promoted a young man 王 洪 文 (Wang Hongwen) and tried to make Wang to be his new successor. When Wang became one of the Gang of Four, Mao gave up on him. Mr. Short wrote, "To Mao's disgust and annoyance, his young Shanghai protege, instead of establishing himself as an independent force in the leadership, had foolishly (if predictably, given his background) aligned himself with Jiang Qing [Mao's wife] and the rest of the radical group." (page 615, Mao -- a life).
In March 1973, Mao promoted another young man 華 國 鋒 (Hua Guofeng) as another possible choice to be his successor. Hua, indeed, became the Head of State after Mao's death. The Gang of Four was arrested by Hua in October 1976, exactly four weeks after Mao's death.
- 批 孔 揚 秦 (to criticize Confucius and to honor the Emperor Qin Shihuang).
Mr. Short wrote, "As so often, it was Mao himself who chose the terrain. In May 1973, he had proposed to a Central Committee work conference a campaign to criticize Confucius (who had, of course, died 2,500 years earlier). The pretext was that Lin Liguo [son of Lin Biao] had likened Mao to Qin Shihuang, the First Emperor of Qin, who had 'burned the [Confucian] books and buried the scholars alive'. Mao generally welcomed that comparison. But this time he had chosen to interpret it as meaning that Lin Biao and his followers -- since they opposed Qin Shihuang -- were supporters of Confucius, and therefore of the feudal landlord system that the Sage had extolled in his writings. However, things were not quite what they seemed. By associating Confucius with Lin Biao, Mao was playing the old game of 'pointing at the locust tree in order to revile the mulberry'. The true target of the new movement was neither Confucius nor Lin Biao, but Zhou Enlai [the Premier]." (page 612, Mao -- a life).
iii. The true enemy of China in 1966
The events above are historical facts. I, however, disagree with some interpretations. The issue of 'to revile the mulberry by pointing at the locust' was, indeed, the true feelings of those (such as, Zhou, Deng, or others) who were part of that history. However, there was no political infighting during the entire period of Cultural Revolution between Mao and the others, as no one, absolutely no one, could even contemplate the word 'fighting' with Mao. Mao could remove anyone with a snap of a finger. Mao's true target was Confucius while letting others thinking that they were the locusts. The sole purpose of Cultural Revolution was to create a new breed of Chinese people, as a blank sheet of paper, ready to be inscribed with a new culture. Thus, everything old must be smashed. That is, Confucianism must be eradicated from Chinese culture. This was why that Cultural Revolution was started with an article which criticized the drama play of The Dismissal of Hai Rui, as Hai Rui was a role model of Confucian morality.
As a Confucian scholar himself, why was Mao hating Confucianism so deeply? What is Confucianism? In the book, The Meeting of East and West (Third Printing 1968, The Macmillan Company), Dr. Northrop wrote, "..., since the Confucian component stays the nearest to common sense, is the most concrete in its teachings and imagery, and is the nearest of any of the doctrines of the Orient to certain empirical philosophical doctrines and moral teachings of the West." (page 322).
Although America inherited many philosophical thoughts from many philosophers, such as, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Georg Hegel, David Hume, John Dewey, etc., the America's political goal is identical to the aim of Confucianism, to improve the human life, to uphold the human dignity and to ensure that people is the master of themselves. To know more about Confucianism, please read the article Chinese culture and the world security for more details.
Confucianism was the main political -ism 3,000 years before Confucius. However great that -ism was, it inevitably got a dirty and stink coat after 5,000 years.
Confucianism emphasizes three moral traits: loyal, humble, and hard-working. Although humans have the seeds of these three moral traits, they might not sprout if not cultivated. Yet, both dog and horse have these three traits from birth.
Confucianism as an -ism itself, it has never made any connections between these three moral virtues with dogs and horses. Yet, a culture of dog and horse was developed to express these virtues. The followings are some examples:
Indeed, in order to profess their Confucian virtues (loyal, humble and hard-working), many great Confucian scholars used the words of dog and horse to denote themselves. And, of course, often some of them were called as dog farts and dog turds. In fact, after 5,000 years, Confucianism did acquire a coat of dog-shit. Almost every Chinese was boxed in a dog turd cocoon before the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese culture became a sea of dog turds. In that sea of dog turds, no significant culture advancement was made during the past 2,000 years. The Chinese culture energy was drowned in that sea of dog turds for two thousand years. Even the national hero, Peng Dehuai who had defeated American General in Korea, was turning out to be made of the bullshit stock.
- 犬 子 (son of dog). This phrase is a very, very polite way to introduce one's son to others. The word 犬 means dog and the word 子 means child. 犬 子 denotes (not connotes) "My son," and it of course not denotes as puppy of a true dog. The word 狗 also means dog. 小 狗 is the way to denote the puppy of a true dog.
- 效 犬 馬 之 勞 (to serve you as your dog and horse). This is also a very, very polite way to pledge a service. The word 馬 is horse.
- 拍 馬 屁 (caressing the horse's buttocks). It means kissing the ass. The only difference is that Chinese can only kiss master's horse's buttocks, not the master's own behind.
- 狗 屁 (dog's fart). Would anyone every heard dog's fart? This phrase does not denote as dog's fart. It denotes (not connotes) someone's sayings, as sayings can come out from two places, one from mouth and one as fart. This phrase will never be confused as the fart of dog. It always denotes as someone's sayings which as worthy as dog's fart.
Mr Short wrote, "Even men like Liang Shuming should be free to spread their ideas:'If they have something to fart about, let them fart! If it's out, then one can decide whether it smells bad or good... If the people think heir farts stink, they will be isolated'." (page 458, Mao -- a life).
- 狗 屎 (dog's turd). This phrase can connote as someone or someone's act. Mr. Short wrote, "Another constant theme was the Party's mistreatment of intellectuals, who were regarded as 'dog-shit one moment and 10,000 ounces of gold the next'." (page 465, Mao -- a life).
Mr Short wrote, "They were no longer quite the same people as they had been before the Cultural Revolution. The constant injunctions 'to rebel' and 'to go against the tide' had finally succeeded in undermining the tradition of blind faith in authority that had characterized earlier generations of Chinese." (page 622, Mao -- a life).
"He wielded powers equaled only by the most awesome of Chinese emperors, in an era when China's history was so compressed that changes which, in the West, had taken centuries to accomplish, occurred in a single generation. In Mao's lifetime, China made the leap from semi-colony to Great Power; from millennial autarky to socialist state; from despoiled victim of imperialist plunder to Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, complete with H-bombs, surveillance satellites and ICBMS." (page 630, Mao -- a life).
In fact, the Cultural Revolution was only a culture revolution, to sweep away the sea of dog turd and to free every Chinese from the cocoon of dog turd. It has nothing to do with any political infighting. Any political leader who was swept away during that period was simply not measuring up to the task for him.
IV. Finding a true friend
Only by correctly understanding the meaning of Cultural Revolution, we will be able to know what China really is today.
Although Chinese cultural energy was boxed in dog turds for two thousand years, Chinese culture always had a great internal energy. And, that energy has broken out from the dog turd cocoon after the Cultural Revolution. If America sees China as a foe, she will not be afraid to play that role.
- Can China ever challenge America?
- Will China become a threat of the world peace?
However, Confucianism is a five thousand year old Immortal. However mighty Mao was, he was unable to defeat Confucianism. He did sweep the sea of dog turd away. He did release every Chinese from the cocoon of dog turd. Yet, Confucian moral virtues (loyal, humble and hard-working) remain. If America sees China as a friend, China will be a loyal, humble and hard-working friend of America.
That is, the key of the world peace is in America's hand. Per law three above, "Ignorance will guarantee a failure." Our ignorance of June 4th 1989 event has prevented us to decide whether China must be a foe or she can be a friend.
The June 1989 event in Tiananmen was defined by America (both media and government) as a student movement to demand democracy from an authoritarian government. With this definition, China can only be an evil foe whom America must work with from issue to issue. With this definition, America could lose the only way to protect America's interest in Iraq and the only way to solve the Iran nuke issue.
Of course, America's definition was wrong. The students of that event were born during the Cultural Revolution, and every American knew all too well that those students had no chance of any kind to understand what the America's democracy was all about, as America's democracy was after all the result of thousand years of philosophical inquiry and of over two hundred years of refinement. Can a fish fly in the sky after learning how to spell the word fly? Those students did not even know much about Chinese culture. Now, many of them are in the USA today, and I would like to give them some very simple tests, three Chinese words, 掌 (palm), 指 (finger) and 腳 (foot). Why are those three words written as they are, not otherwise?
To be fair to them, I will give an answer to one. The word 掌 (palm) consists of two words, 尚 which is the same word as 上 (top or upper side) and the word 手 (hand). Thus, 掌 as 尚 手 (the upper side of the hand).
I bet; none of them will know why 指 (finger) and 腳 (foot) are written as they are.
Yet, those students do know about Mao's democracy, the anarchy democracy. While Mao's purpose of Cultural Revolution was to sweep away the sea of dog turd from the Chinese culture, the method he used was the anarchy democracy, at least, with such a name. Mr. Short wrote, "[testament of Mao] ... The second thing I have done you all know. It was to launch the Cultural Revolution, which now has the support of few and is opposed by many. But this matter is not ended yet. It is a legacy which must be handed down to the next generation. How should it be handed down? If not in peace, then in turmoil. If this is not properly handled, there will be bloodshed. Heaven alone knows what you will do." (page 625, Mao -- a life).
The bloodshed indeed, those students were demanding the return of Mao's democracy. On June 4th, 1989, the blood in Tiananmen Square truly ended the Mao's democracy.
With the sea of Confucian dog turd swept away and with Mao's anarchy democracy formerly ended, China was ready to move with full-speed ahead. Chinese economy made double digit growth every year even since. The June 4th event of 1989 was, indeed, an elixir for China.
Yet, America's definition on the June 4th event (which directed or re-directed the America's China policy) was not the result of ignorance. It was a self-deceiving. For many years, American media claimed that there were thousands or tens of thousands of death at the Tiananmen Square. Only very recent years (2004 - 2006), America's media began to admit that there were no killing in the Tiananmen Square proper. In the book Punishment Season (1990 by the Asia Watch Committee, ISBN 0-929692-51-9), it wrote, "On November 4, 1989, Reuters quoted William Webster, head of the CIA, as saying that 'probably thousands of people have been killed' since the crackdown first began." (page 8).
In page 27, it has an * note in fine print, "... no massacre in Tiananmen Square itself, a view which accords with the Chinese government's version of events. ..." A photo copy of this page is attached at the end of this article.
The point is not about how many died. One is one too many. If the number of death is the measurement for our policy, why should we use June 4th as an issue? Millions perished during the Cultural Revolution and tens millions died before that. Although Mao did not intend to kill those millions, he did not show much sympathy for them neither. Those were the price that China must pay in order to transform herself.
With the book of Asia Watch Committee, many facts for the June 4th 1989 event were known by 1990. Yet, both America's media and government misled American people for many years. If the purpose was a mis-information campaign to demonize the foe, it would be understandable. But, should we view China as a demonic foe? Without a true understanding of what China is all about, we cannot truly answer this question.
Are we truly understood about China? Mr. Short wrote, "Mao's tragedy and his grandeur were that he remained to the end in thrall to his own revolutionary dreams. Where Confucius had taught harmony -- the doctrine of the mean -- Mao preached endless class struggle, until it became a cage from which neither he nor the Chinese people could escape. He freed China from the straitjacket of its Confucian past. But the bright Red future he promised turned out to be a sterile purgatory." (page 632, Mao -- a life).
I, of course, totally disagree with Mr. Short's conclusion. All the facts in his book (Mao -- a life, total 782 pages) are correct. His comment on every individual event is fair, as seemingly he got those from many Chinese sources. Yet, his final judgement on Mao's last 27 years is negative and unfavorable. In terms of number people died during those years, no one can disagree with him. But, seemingly, the death of millions was not the major issue for his negativeness. From the Chapter Titles, Mr. Short gave out a scent of sarcasm. The followings are some of the Titles:
In some senses, these titles do reflect some superficial realities of those events. Yet, using those titles without any sub-titles shows the intention of sarcasm. Thus, I did not try to tell the above stories with my own words, but by quoting Mr. Short's passages. I want to show that a completely different conclusion can be reached by using his words.
- Chapter 13 -- The Sorcerer's Apprentice
- Chapter 14 -- Musings on Immortality
- Chapter 15 -- Cataclysm
- Chapter 16 -- Things Fall Apart
In addition to his sarcastic attitude, he obviously did not master the Chinese language. Mr. Short wrote,"Their estrangement made him nostalgic for his former wives: ... and for Yang Kaihui, whose memory now drew from him a romantic, astonishingly beautiful poem, which he entitled 'The Immortals'. It was address to an old friend, Li Shuyi, ... Li' husband, Liu Zhixun, had been killed not long after Kaihui. In Chinese, their names signify 'willow' and 'poplar', a play on words which Mao entwined with the legend of Wu Gang, a Sisyphus-figure condemned to cut down an ever-lasting cassia tree on the moon:
I lost my proud poplar, and you your willow;
Poplar and willow soar to the highest heaven,
Wu Gang, asked what he has to offer,
Presents them humbly with cassia wine.
The lonely goddess in the moon spreads her ample sleeves
to dance for these good souls in the endless sky.
Of a sudden comes word of the Tiger's defeat on earth
Tears stream down like an upturned bowl of rain."
(page 473, Mao -- a life)
Can anyone truly understand this poem? What did Mao try to say?
In order to read a Chinese poem, a reader must know the followings:
Now, I am copying the original poem in Chinese first. Then, I will translate it in English.
- One Chinese word can mean two or many different things. And, they must be read or translated in its intended meaning. Otherwise, no one will know the difference between the chicken and the duck.
- Some facts are not written out. But, readers must know them in order to make sense of the poem.
- Some feelings are not written out. Readers must fill those emotions with their own feelings. That is, in a sense, the readers are also the authors of the poem.
我 失 驕 楊 君 失 柳 ,
楊 柳 輕 揚 ， 直 上 重 霄 九 .
問 訊 吳 剛 何 所 有 ,
吳 剛 捧 出 桂 花 酒 .
寂 寞 嫦 娥 舒 廣 袖 ,
萬 里 長 空 ， 且 為 忠 魂 舞 .
忽 報 人 間 曾 伏 虎 ,
淚 飛 頓 作 傾 盆 雨 .
The word 楊 in the first verse means Mao's first wife 楊 開 慧 (Yang Kaihui). It is her last name. The same word in the second verse means the poplar tree flower. The word 柳 in the first verse means Li's husband 柳 直 荀 (Liu Zhixun), and it is his last name. The same word in the second verse means the leaves of willow tree. The word 虎 (tiger) in the seventh verse means Chiang Kai-shek and Guomindang. By knowing these, we now are able to translate the poem.
I lost my proud wife Yang ( 楊 ), and you your husband Liu ( 柳 )
As the soaring poplar flower ( 楊 ) and the willow leaf ( 柳 ), their souls entered into the highest heaven.
Asking Wu Gang, what was there he had [for their enjoyment]?
Wu Gang brought out cassia wine.
The lonely goddess of the Moon spreads her ample sleeves
In the endless sky, she dances for these loyal souls.
Of a sudden comes news that the Guomindang tiger is defeated on earth
Their tears [of happiness] raining down from the sky as heavy as the water pouring out from a basin.
My translation might not be good in terms of literature. But, Mao's poem is now making sense. With this small example, I would like to reiterate the Law Three again.
Law Three: Ignorance will guarantee a failure.
Not only will ignorance guarantee a failure in terms of a national policy, but it will fail in translating a poem. And, there is another important law, the Law Six.
Law Six: Self-deceiving is worst than ignorance.
In the book, Diplomacy, Dr. Kissinger wrote, "A credibility gap was inherent in America's entire enterprise, not so much because America's leaders deceived the public but because they deceived themselves about their capabilities, including the ease with which familiar institutions could be transferred to other cultures." (page 653).
Our judgement on the June 4th 1989 event was a self-deceiving. The only chance of finding a true friend is that she trusts us. The only way for her to trust us is that we trust her first. Yet, the only way to trust anyone is by knowing her soul, not by the ignorance of a blind faith. If we cannot even translate a poem correctly, ...
V. Solution of Iraq predicament and Iran Nuke problem
We must convince Iran that we will take an Iraq-invasion type of military action against her if she develops the Nuke. The only way that Iran will be convinced of that is that we succeed in Iraq. And there is only one way to succeed.
As no people, including Iraqis, is willing to live in chaos and in killing. Twenty years are long enough to pacify all radicals if the living of other Iraqis has been taking care of. If a second NATO is able to provide 100,000 troops for a twenty year commitment to act as a buffer between the Iraqi radicals and America, we can and will convince Iran that her best choice is to drop the Nuke program.
- We must remain in Iraq with some permanent military bases.
- Our daily casualty must be near to zero.
There is such a second NATO country to fit the bill in this world if we want to find it. Please read the article Solution on North Korea Nuke at http://www.chinese-word-roots.org/cwr013.htm for details.
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